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LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE
AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT:
WHY RLUIPA SHOULD NOT BE AMENDED TO REGULATE
EMINENT DOMAIN ACTIONS AGAINST
RELIGIOUS PROPERTY
Cristina Finetti
I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

Government entities from time to time exercise the power of
eminent domain to acquire property, including property owned by
religious institutions, in order to redevelop a downtrodden
neighborhood or further some other legitimate public purpose. For
example, Broward County, Florida, planned to construct a drug and
alcohol detoxification center on a parcel of land in Fort Lauderdale,
1
the site of the Christian Romany Church. The Church pastor leased
the church property, but exercised an option to buy the property for
2
$1.27 million after he learned about the County’s plans. The Broward County Circuit Court granted the County permission to force a
$1.6 million sale of the property through the exercise of its eminent
domain power, because the planned development of a drug and al3
cohol recovery center constituted a public use. The Broward County
situation shows that churches and other religious property are not
beyond the government’s power to take land for the public use.
At times, religious institutions faced with condemnation challenge the action on grounds of discrimination and burdens on the
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1
Brittany Wallman, Church Faces Forced Closing; Judge Has Approved Eminent Domain Purchase So Broward Can Build Detoxification Center on Site, SUN SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla.), July 28, 2007, at 1B.
2
Id.
3
Id. Counsel for the Christian Romany Church plans to appeal the decision. Id.
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5

free exercise of religion. The institutions believe they are unfairly
targeted with condemnation due to their non-profit status or simply
6
out of animosity toward certain religious beliefs. For example, a
Muslim group in Paterson, New Jersey, has been trying to build a
7
mosque on a tract of land in nearby Wayne. For years, Wayne has
stalled the group’s plans by claiming that the township needs to pre8
serve the land as a natural space. The township subsequently passed
9
a resolution to acquire the tract by eminent domain. The Muslim
10
group claims it is being treated unfairly and has sued Wayne.
11
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) was passed in 2000 in response to what Congress felt was
12
an unwelcome change in free exercise law. RLUIPA, which applies
only to land use and prison contexts, polices the imposition of substantial burdens on religious exercise by requiring such burdens to
further a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to
13
achieve that interest —this is the “strict scrutiny” test. Although
RLUIPA’s land use provision expressly applies only to zoning and
14
landmarking laws that substantially burden religious exercise, many
religious institutions facing condemnation use RLUIPA to challenge
15
the attempted taking. In fact, Senator Edward Kennedy began ef4

U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion] . . . .”).
5
See infra Part III.A.
6
See infra Part III.A.
7
John Chadwick, Muslim Group: Bias Stalling Mosque Plans, THE HERALD NEWS
(Passaic County, N.J.), July 19, 2006, at B4.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. On November 1, 2006, Judge Peter G. Sheridan of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey temporarily enjoined Wayne from condemning the property based on suspicion of the town’s motives, and also enjoined the
Muslim group from beginning construction on the mosque at this site. Peter J.
Sampson, Judge Stalls Mosque Dispute: Sets Trial on Town’s Plan to Seize Tract, THE
HERALD NEWS (Passaic County, N.J.), Nov. 2, 2006, at B1. Judge Sheridan subsequently denied each side’s motion for summary judgment, leaving claims of intentional discrimination and substantial burden on religious exercise for the fact-finder.
Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-cv-3217, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73176, at *24–42 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007).
11
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114
Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2000)).
12
See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
13
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
14
Id. §§ 2000cc(a), 2000cc-5(5).
15
E.g., Chadwick, supra note 7, at B4. The Muslim group alleges that Wayne violated RLUIPA, among other claims. Id.; see also infra Part III.A.
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forts to amend RLUIPA to explicitly include eminent domain within
16
the scope of the statute.
This Comment will argue that RLUIPA does not cover eminent
domain actions and should not be amended to subject eminent domain actions against religious property to strict scrutiny review. Part
II traces the changes in free exercise law which led to the passage of
RLUIPA. Part III explains why the current version of RLUIPA does
not cover eminent domain, through an examination of recent case
law, the legislative history, and the fundamental conceptual distinctions between eminent domain and zoning and landmarking laws.
Part IV explains that RLUIPA should not be amended to cover eminent domain because eminent domain is a generally applicable law
ordinarily subject to rational basis review, and that religious institutions seeking to challenge a condemnation have alternative legal re17
course under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and
18
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
section also demonstrates that the application of RLUIPA to eminent
domain actions against religious property may severely limit the government’s power to condemn, resulting in a disproportionate impact
on private homes and businesses. Ultimately, this Comment will argue that RLUIPA cannot be expanded to the point that it erodes the
vital government power of eminent domain.
II. BACKGROUND
19

Employment Division v. Smith served as the catalyst for a series of
congressional efforts to heighten the protection of religious practice
20
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In Smith,
two members of the Native American Church were terminated from
their employment and denied unemployment compensation for in21
gesting peyote as part of a Church sacrament. Oregon law prohibits
22
the possession of controlled substances, including peyote. The issue
16

E-mail from Jim Walsh, Staffer for Sen. Edward Kennedy, Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, to author (Sept. 29, 2006, 18:38:07 EST) (on file with author).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion] . . . .”).
18
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
19
494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb to -4 (2000)).
20
See infra notes 31–46 and accompanying text.
21
494 U.S. at 874.
22
Id.
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was whether the Oregon drug law burdened the Native American
Church members’ religious practice in violation of the Free Exercise
23
Clause. The Supreme Court of the United States held that a burden
on religion that is “merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision” does not offend the Free Exer24
cise Clause, and upheld the Oregon law. To explain this rule, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, set forth an example of a
25
generally applicable law—taxation.
Justice Scalia articulated that
taxation will impose an incidental burden on those who consider
taxation to be sinful; however, it is not the objective of the tax law to
26
burden religions. To grant an individual an exemption from taxation would “make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior
to the law of the land, and in effect . . . permit every citizen to be27
come a law unto himself.”
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor stated that the
Court’s holding was a dramatic shift from prior First Amendment ju28
risprudence.
Previously, the Court applied strict scrutiny review,
which required “the government to justify any substantial burden on
religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by
29
means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Justice O’Connor
stressed that laws indirectly burdening religious activity were just as
dangerous as laws aimed directly at religious activity and argued to
30
preserve strict scrutiny review.

23

Id. at 874–78.
Id. at 878, 890.
25
Id. at 878.
26
Id.
27
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67
(1879)).
28
Id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
29
Id. at 894 (citations omitted). The strict scrutiny standard was applied to free
exercise challenges in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law, which required students to attend school
until age sixteen, impermissibly burdened the Amish community’s religious practice
of requiring its members to leave school at age fourteen or fifteen), and Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the South Carolina Employment Security
Commission’s denial of unemployment compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist because of her refusal to work on the Sabbath out of the fear of false unemployment
claims was not a compelling reason to justify the substantial burden on religious
practice). It is arguable that “Smith simply changed the doctrine of the free exercise
clause to reflect the actual pattern of decisions. . . . [T]he Court had rejected all free
exercise clause claims since 1960 except for the employment benefit cases and Yoder.”
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1213 (2d ed.
2002).
30
Smith, 494 U.S. at 897–901.
24
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In response to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
31
Restoration Act (RFRA) to reinstate strict scrutiny review of substan32
Under RFRA, “[g]overnment
tial burdens on religious conduct.
shall not burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless such burden passes
33
34
strict scrutiny review. RFRA applied to both federal and state law.
35
However, RFRA was short-lived; in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court found RFRA unconstitutional because it exceeded the
36
scope of Congress’s power under the Enforcement Clause of the
37
Fourteenth Amendment. Under the Enforcement Clause, Congress
can only exercise remedial powers congruent and proportional to the
38
The Court determined
alleged problem sought to be corrected.
that RFRA was not remedial legislation, but a substantive change in
39
constitutional law. The Act’s “[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting
official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject
40
matter.” Thus, RFRA was invalid because it permitted a tremendous
imposition on the states’ ability to enforce general laws to promote
41
citizens’ health and welfare. As the law stands today, RFRA is only
42
valid insofar as it applies to actions of the federal government.
31

Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2000)).
32
H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 4 (1999).
33
RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(a), (b), 107 Stat. 1488, 1488–89 (1993).
34
Id. § 6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489.
35
521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc to -5 (2000)).
36
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.”).
37
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
38
Id. at 519–20.
39
Id. at 532.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 534.
42
See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958, 960 (10th Cir. 2001). Thus, the current version of RFRA supersedes the holding in Employment Division v. Smith, but only insofar as the substantial burdens at issue result from actions by the federal government. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 29, at 1217. For example, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), the respondent church required its members to drink
hoasca tea as a communion ritual. Id. at 425. This tea contained a hallucinogenic
substance regulated under the Controlled Substances Act, a federal law of general
applicability. Id. The Supreme Court found that the government could not prohibit
the church’s use of the sacramental tea because it failed to put forth a compelling
interest in support of the prohibition. Id. at 439. It is also important to note that several states have enacted their own religious protection statutes—mini-RFRAs that re-
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In 2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institu43
tionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Under RLUIPA:
[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of
the burden on that person, assembly, or institution—
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compel44
ling governmental interest.

RLUIPA defines “land use regulation” as “a zoning or landmarking
law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claim45
ant’s use or development of land.” RLUIPA defines “government”
as “(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity
created under the authority of a State; (ii) any branch, department,
agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and
46
(iii) any other person acting under color of State law.” The scope of
RLUIPA extends to situations where
(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity
that receives Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability;
(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial
burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the
several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability; or
(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of
a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under
which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal
procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property in47
volved.
store strict scrutiny review to government-imposed burdens on religious exercise.
Thomas C. Berg, On the Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or
Belief in the United States, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1277, 1288 (2005). For example, the
Illinois legislature passed its own Religious Freedom Restoration Act because the
Boerne decision only invalidated the federal RFRA as far as it applied to the states. St.
John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, No. 05-4418, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 21914, at *42 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007). A discussion of state-originating religious freedom legislation is beyond the scope of this Comment.
43
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2000).
44
Id. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B).
45
Id. § 2000cc-5(5).
46
Id. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(i)–(iii).
47
Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(C).
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Thus, RLUIPA provides three constitutional bases for its power: the
48
49
Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Enforcement
50
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
RLUIPA was designed to fill in the gaps left by Flores’s invalida51
52
tion of RFRA. It applies to state actions only, and it comports with
Congress’s powers under the Enforcement Clause because it targets
53
two very specific areas—land use and institutional conditions. Congress heard extensive testimony regarding the burdens on religious
liberty, and the evidence indicated that free exercise rights are most
54
frequently burdened in the land use and institutional contexts.
Thus, RLUIPA was developed with a narrow focus to achieve a con55
gruent and proportional response to a serious problem. However,
courts and commentators continue to debate the constitutionality of
56
RLUIPA. For example, the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s provision regarding institutionalized persons against a challenge that it
57
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, but it
has not yet addressed the constitutionality of the land use provisions

48

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States . . . .”).
49
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes
. . . .”).
50
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
51
See Corey Mertes, Note, God’s Little Acre: Religious Land Use and the Separation of
Church and State, 74 UMKC L. REV. 221, 223–25 (2005); Mark Spykerman, Note, When
God and Costco Battle for a City’s Soul: Can the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act Fairly Adjudicate Both Sides in Land Use Disputes?, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 291,
298–303 (2005).
52
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(i)–(iii) (2000).
53
146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). RLUIPA also requires strict scrutiny review of a government action that imposes a “substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person
residing in or confined to an institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2). This Comment will not discuss the application of RLUIPA to prisoners or other institutionalized persons.
54
146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774–75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
55
See id.
56
See Ariel Graff, Comment, Calibrating the Balance of Free Exercise, Religious Establishment, and Land Use Regulation: Is RLUIPA an Unconstitutional Response to an Overstated Problem?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 485, 514–17 (2005); Mertes, supra note 51, at 234–36;
Spykerman, supra note 51, at 303–05.
57
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”).
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58

as such. Despite its questionable constitutionality, as it stands today,
RLUIPA supersedes the Smith rule that generally applicable laws that
burden religious exercise do not offend the First Amendment, but
only insofar as a state or its subdivisions impose a substantial burden
on religious exercise within the specific contexts of zoning and
59
landmarking situations and prison issues.
60
The Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London clarified the government’s power of eminent domain. Pursuant to the
61
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the government is authorized to take private land for public use, as long as it
62
In
pays just compensation to the owner of the private property.
Kelo, the Court interpreted “public use” as “public purpose,” rather
63
than the narrower “use by the public” definition.
The Court accommodated the definition to the realities of public uses of formerly
private land—private property was no longer condemned solely to
construct railroads and highways, but also to establish facilities and
64
residences for indirect public use and overall public benefit. The
Court determined that the broad scope of “public purpose” encom58

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). In Cutter, prisoners housed by
the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction claimed prison officials impeded their practice of non-mainstream religions. Id. at 712. The prison officials
responded that RLUIPA impermissibly advances religion because it encourages prisoners to adopt religious beliefs in order to receive more benefits. Id. at 714, 721
n.10. The Court held that the institutionalized persons provision does not offend
the Establishment Clause because it accommodates religious beliefs without favoring
one belief over another or overriding legitimate concerns for prison order and
safety. Id. at 720–23. However, the Court explicitly noted that it did not address the
constitutional validity of the RLUIPA provision regarding land use regulation. Id. at
716 n.3.
59
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 1217.
60
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
61
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
62
Id. The public use and just compensation requirements that accompany the
power of eminent domain are binding on the states by incorporation of the Fifth
Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Haw.
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 n.7 (1984) (citing Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).
63
545 U.S. at 479–80.
64
See id. at 479–80 & nn. 7–8. The Court suggested that condemnation to promote economic development was not a new concept. See id. at 480–84 (“There is . . .
no principled way of distinguishing economic development from other public purposes that we have recognized.”). To dispel the notion that Kelo actually broke new
ground by permitting condemnation for economic development, Thomas Merrill
highlights Justice Stevens’s references to takings to facilitate farming and mining,
and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), where trade secrets were taken
to promote competition in the pesticide market. Thomas W. Merrill, Six Myths About
Kelo, 20 A.B.A. PROB. & PROP. 19, 20 (2006).
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passed condemnation for general economic development, thus enabling the City of New London to condemn an economically depressed area and develop an industrial park to revitalize the local
65
economy. Although not explicitly stated, Justice Stevens essentially
applied rational basis scrutiny to the city’s eminent domain proceedings, evidenced by the statement, that “[f]or more than a century,
our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and
intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in
66
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”
By finding economic development consistent with public use, the
Court continued the trend of granting deference to legislatures to
67
exercise the eminent domain power.
The Becket Fund, a public interest law firm specializing in free
exercise claims, filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the petition68
ers in Kelo. Although the City of New London did not condemn any
religious property, the Becket Fund attorneys expressed concern that
the expansion of eminent domain power would permit municipalities
69
The
to target religious property due to their tax-exempt status.
65

See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472, 484–85.
Id. at 483. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy stressed that although there is
a presumption that the government has taken the property for a legitimate purpose,
accusations of favoritism toward private developers must be reviewed carefully. Id. at
492 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He also did not discount the application of a higher
scrutiny to “a more narrowly drawn category of takings.” Id. at 493. Thomas Merrill
suggests that the majority actually invokes a higher scrutiny than rational basis review, evidenced by Justice Stevens’s statement that condemnation actions should be
reviewed carefully to watch for the “mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual
purpose was to bestow a private benefit.” Merrill, supra note 64, at 20–21 (citing Kelo,
545 U.S. at 478). In any event, the Court certainly does not invoke strict scrutiny,
and Kelo is neither the first nor last case involving the application of a low level of
scrutiny to review eminent domain actions. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 241–43 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); City of Guymon v. Cal
Farley’s Boys Ranch, No. CIV-04-457-BA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38506, at *10–12
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 2005).
67
See Kelo, U.S. 545 at 483. Of course, the deference applied to legislatures to
effectuate a taking for economic development was strongly challenged by the dissent
in Kelo. Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, argued that although judicial review of a legislature’s decision to condemn property is narrow, taking for economic development is unconstitutional because it significantly differs from the permissible types of condemnation established
over time (transfer of private property to public ownership, transfer of private property to be used by the public, and condemnation to eradicate a pre-condemnation
use of property that was harmful to society). Id. at 497–501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
68
Brief of Amicus Curiae The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of
Petitioners at 1, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 801 [hereinafter Becket Fund Brief].
69
Id. at 6–7.
66
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Becket Fund stated that “a judgment . . . that potential economic development and tax revenue growth concerns justify property transfers
from one private owner to another . . . would place religious institu70
tions at special risk of eminent domain actions.” The Becket Fund
offered several examples of religious property faced with the threat of
71
condemnation. For instance, the City of New Rochelle, New York,
72
chose to condemn two churches to build an IKEA store.
The Smith decision removed neutral laws of general applicability
73
from the purview of strict scrutiny review. This change in free exercise jurisprudence compelled Congress to pass reform measures,
culminating in RLUIPA, which reinstates strict scrutiny review of state
government burdens on religious activity in the land use and institu74
tional contexts. Similarly, the Kelo Court’s interpretation of public
use sparked a nationwide debate over the proper use of eminent domain, prompting state legislatures to pass restrictions on the takings
75
power. The Becket Fund amicus brief sheds light on the possible
effects of Kelo on religious property, raising the question, should religious property receive heightened protection against eminent domain actions? The intersection of two major legal issues—religious
liberty and eminent domain—is the focus of this Comment.
III. IN ITS CURRENT FORM, RLUIPA DOES NOT
COVER EMINENT DOMAIN
76

Three recent cases—Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, St.
77
John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, and City & County of
78
Honolulu v. Sherman —have held that the plain language of RLUIPA,
defining a land use regulation as a zoning or landmarking law, does
70

Id. at 6.
Id. at 6–11.
72
Id. at 11 n.20.
73
See supra notes 19–27 and accompanying text.
74
See supra notes 31–46 and accompanying text.
75
Since the Kelo decision was handed down, thirty-four states have passed legislation designed to reform eminent domain proceedings. INST. FOR JUSTICE CASTLE
COALITION, LEGISLATIVE ACTION SINCE KELO 1–2 (2006). For example, Florida recently passed amendments to its eminent domain law, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.013–
73.014 (LexisNexis 2007), which requires municipalities to wait ten years prior to
transferring from one party to another land acquired via eminent domain (to essentially eliminate the incentive for private development) and forbids municipalities to
use eminent domain to combat blight. CASTLE COALITION, supra, at 4.
76
405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
77
401 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, No. 05-4418, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007).
78
129 P.3d 542 (Haw. 2006).
71
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79

not encompass eminent domain. In terms of legislative intent, Faith
Temple Church also suggested that Congress did not intend RLUIPA to
80
regulate the government’s power of eminent domain. The legislative history confirms that Congress intended to police burdens on re81
ligious property from zoning and landmarking laws only.
Additional evidence to support this conclusion comes from the very
nature of eminent domain itself and theories to support government
82
use of the takings power. Only one case, Cottonwood Christian Center
83
v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, applied RLUIPA to an eminent domain action, but this ruling was consistently rejected in the most re84
cent cases on point.
A. Recent Case Law
1.

Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress
Redevelopment Agency

Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency involved
the first use of RLUIPA to challenge condemnation of religious
85
property. In an effort to expand, the Cottonwood Christian Center
acquired several parcels of land in a section of Cypress, California,
86
designated as blighted. When the city received a bid from Costco to
build a store on land within the blighted area owned by Cottonwood,
87
it initiated a condemnation action against Cottonwood. The church
88
claimed that this exercise of eminent domain violated RLUIPA.
The court determined that the controversy centered on the applica89
tion of a land use regulation involving an individualized assessment,
90
so it applied strict scrutiny review to the condemnation action. In a
note, the court rejected the city’s contention that RLUIPA does not
79

St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 899–900; Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at
254–55; Sherman, 129 P.3d at 560–63.
80
See Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254–56; infra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
81
See infra Part III.B.
82
See infra Part III.C.
83
218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
84
Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d. at 256–57; St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d. at
899–900; Sherman, 129 P.3d. at 563–64.
85
Shelly Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land Uses,
69 MO. L. REV. 653, 666 (2004).
86
Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1209–13.
87
Id. at 1214–15.
88
Id. at 1218.
89
Id. at 1222.
90
Id.
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91

apply to eminent domain.
The court stated that condemnation
proceedings were covered under RLUIPA’s definition of land use
regulation because the “Redevelopment Agency’s authority to exercise eminent domain to contravene blight . . . is based on a zoning
system developed by the City [and] would unquestionably ‘limit[] or
92
restrict[]’ Cottonwood’s ‘use or development of land.’” The court
ultimately held that Cypress’s condemnation action imposed a sub93
stantial burden on Cottonwood, which failed strict scrutiny review.
2.

Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton

Several recent cases have rejected the Cottonwood court’s application of RLUIPA to eminent domain actions. In Faith Temple Church v.
Town of Brighton, the District Court for the Western District of New
94
York stated explicitly that RLUIPA does not cover eminent domain.
Faith Temple Church purchased a parcel of land in the Town of
95
Brighton to construct a new church facility. The town initiated a
condemnation proceeding against Faith Temple Church under New
York’s eminent domain authority in order to acquire this land for de96
velopment as a town park. The Church sought to enjoin the town
from using its power of eminent domain to acquire the property and
97
claimed that the condemnation violated RLUIPA.
The court addressed the town’s response that RLUIPA does not
cover eminent domain by first examining the language of the stat98
ute.
The court pointed out that there is no explicit mention of
99
eminent domain anywhere in the statute. The court explained that
RLUIPA applies to government imposition of a land use regulation,
defined as a “‘zoning or landmarking law’ that limits the manner in
which a claimant may develop or use property in which the claimant
91

Id. at 1222 n.9.
Cottonwnood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 n.9 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5)
(2000)).
93
Id. at 1226–29.
94
Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (W.D.N.Y.
2005). The parties settled just days before oral arguments were set to be heard in
Faith Temple’s appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Marketta Gregory, Brighton Land Case Settled, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT AND CHRONICLE
(Rochester, N.Y.), Nov. 10, 2006, at 1B.
95
Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
96
Id. at 251–52.
97
Id. at 252.
98
Id. at 254.
99
Id. at 255 (“Conspicuously absent is any mention of eminent domain. Eminent
domain is hardly an arcane or little-known concept, and the Court will not assume
that Congress simply overlooked it when drafting RLUIPA.”).
92
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100

has an interest.”
The court stated that eminent domain clearly is
not a landmarking law, which is defined under New York law as
“regulat[ion] and restrict[ion of] certain areas as national historic
landmarks, special historic sites, places and buildings for the purpose
of conservation, protection, enhancement and perpetuation of these
101
Then, the court determined that emiplaces of natural heritage.”
nent domain cannot be classified as a zoning law due to fundamental
102
differences between the two types of government powers.
Under
New York law, towns can enact zoning laws to “regulate and restrict”
certain aspects of property, while eminent domain involves the power
103
to “take.”
Even though the court determined that the language of RLUIPA
on its face does not cover eminent domain, the court still conducted
an examination of Congress’s development of RLUIPA to resolve any
104
possible ambiguity.
The court noted that the legislative history indicates that Congress was concerned with the application of zoning
laws to religious property, but the history “appears to contain no references to eminent domain,” which suggests “eminent domain abuse
105
was not perceived to be a cause for concern in drafting RLUIPA.”
The court suggested that Congress likely had good reason to prevent
RLUIPA from extending to eminent domain actions, given the inherent differences between eminent domain and zoning: eminent
domain takes land for public use and provides just compensation,
whereas zoning restricts the use of private land and offers no com106
Thus, the court posited that there is an inherent disinpensation.
centive to using eminent domain to acquire church property, especially from sheer bias, because the government must compensate the
private owner and demonstrate a clearly public use for the land in
107
question.
The court addressed the Church’s contention that the condemnation proceeding is meant to carry out the town’s Comprehensive
Plan, which can be likened to a zoning system because it sought to

100

Id. at 254 (quoting Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 434 (6th 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2000))).
101
Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (quoting N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-700
(Consol. 2007)).
102
Id.
103
Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(e); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (Consol. 2007)).
104
Id. at 255.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 255–56.
107
Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 255–56.
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108

expand the town’s park.
The Church was trying to apply the Cottonwood court’s rationale that whenever eminent domain is based
upon a zoning system, the condemnation falls within the scope of
109
However, the court rejected Cottonwood and found the
RLUIPA.
connection between the eminent domain action and the town’s zon110
ing laws to be too attenuated to reach the language of RLUIPA.
3.

St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago

Similarly, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held that an eminent domain action, unconnected to the application
111
of a zoning or landmarking law, falls outside the scope of RLUIPA.
In St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, the city planned
to expand O’Hare International Airport by constructing runways over
112
St. John’s
existing cemeteries and other neighboring property.
Church, the owner of the cemetery, claimed that the city violated
RLUIPA because relocating the cemetery would impose a substantial
113
burden on the plaintiff’s religious exercise.
The court refused to treat the Cottonwood decision as establishing
114
that all eminent domain actions are subject to RLUIPA.
Plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate that the city’s use of eminent domain was pursuant to or part of a zoning regulation or landmarking law, but instead argued that the city’s use of eminent domain was analogous to
zoning because condemnation placed severe restrictions on the
115
The court exChurch’s use or development of the cemetery.
plained that to classify a taking of property as a restriction is

108

Id. at 256.
Id.
110
Id. at 256–58. The Cottonwood court’s treatment of the eminent domain proceeding as an application of the City’s Redevelopment Plan does not “suggest that
any exercise of eminent domain that relates in some way to a zoning plan falls within
the scope of RLUIPA.” Id. at 256–57 (emphasis added).
111
St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887,
899–901 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
112
Id. at 890.
113
Id. at 891–92.
114
Id. at 899–900 & n.7 (“This Court does not find the Cottonwood court’s reasoning persuasive as it relates to such an attenuated relationship between eminent
domain and zoning.”). Thus, eminent domain alone does not fit the definition of
land use regulation used in RLUIPA. Id. The court did not find that all eminent
domain actions are beyond RLUIPA coverage, but requires some legitimate connection between a zoning or landmarking law and the condemnation. Id. at 900 & n. 8
(“For example, an act to acquire land (through eminent domain) and then to rezone it and transfer it might very well fall within the reach of RLUIPA.”).
115
Id. at 900.
109
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an incorrect classification of the actions at issue in this case. . . .
Land use regulations limit the use of property. Condemnation is,
in one sense, the ultimate limitation on the use of property. It
does not follow, however, that condemnation is a land use regulation as this term is used in the statute. Congress could have in116
cluded “takings” within the reach of RLUIPA but did not.

Ultimately, the court allowed the airport expansion project to pro117
ceed.
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the planned
condemnation of the cemetery did not constitute a “land use regula118
tion” under RLUIPA.
The court rejected St. John’s argument that
the authorization to condemn the cemetery is actually an application
of zoning law, because it changes the use of the land from a religious
119
The court explained that Chiburial ground to airport property.
cago’s plan could not be characterized as zoning because it did not
“dictate to these plaintiffs what they are permitted to do with the plot
of land[;] rather, the City seeks to assume full ownership of the land,
120
The court stressed that
after paying St. John’s full compensation.”
eminent domain and zoning deal with land in very different ways;
121
thus the planned condemnation was not regulated by RLUIPA.
In
addition to its conclusion that eminent domain is not equivalent to
zoning, the Seventh Circuit also concluded that eminent domain itself is not captured by the term “land use regulation” under
122
RLUIPA. As in Faith Temple Church, the court refused to rely on the
Cottonwood dicta that eminent domain is always a land use regula123
tion.
The court reasoned that if Congress intended to include
eminent domain as a land use regulation, it would have said so ex124
plicitly.

116

Id.
St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
118
St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, No. 05-4418, 2007 U.S.
App. LEXIS 21914, at *67–68 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007).
119
Id. at *69.
120
Id.
121
Id. at *69–70 (citing Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp.
2d 250, 254 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)).
122
Id. at *72–74.
123
Id.
124
St. John’s, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914, at *73 (“[B]efore federal law . . . starts
interfering with the fundamental state power of eminent domain, it is likely that we
would need a clear statement from Congress.”).
117
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City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman

In City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii also determined that RLUIPA does not apply to all eminent
125
domain actions.
The Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH)
126
Chapter 38 allowed the City and County of Honolulu to file eminent domain actions to acquire the land underneath condominiums
from the fee owners to convey fee ownership to the lessees of the in127
The First United Methodist Church
dividual condominium units.
was a fee owner of a condominium targeted by the government for
128
The church challenged the action under
condemnation.
129
RLUIPA.
As in both Faith Temple Church and St. John’s, the court explained
that RLUIPA applied to a “land use regulation,” clearly defined as a
130
“zoning or landmarking law.”
The court then set out the common
legal definitions of both zoning and landmarking, and determined
that a “‘zoning or landmarking law’ as defined by RLUIPA must pertain either (1) to the division of a city into districts and the regulation
of the land usage within those districts or (2) to a monument,
131
marker, or building having historical significance.”
The court determined that ROH Chapter 38, which allows the government to acquire condominium property via eminent domain to carry out a
132
lease-to-fee conversion, does not fit within either definition.
B. Legislative History
As noted in Faith Temple Church, the legislative history behind
RLUIPA suggests that Congress was unconcerned with condemnation
133
of religious property.
An in-depth examination of the legislative
history, including a complete review of the congressional hearings
125

See 129 P.3d 542, 564 (Haw. 2006) .
HONOLULU, HAW., REV. ORDINANCES ch. 38 (1991) (repealed by REV.
ORDINANCE 05-001 (2005)). The court indicated that the repeal of the ordinance did
not affect the underlying eminent domain issue. Sherman, 129 P.3d at 545 n.1.
127
Sherman, 129 P.3d at 545 & n.1.
128
Id. at 546.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 560.
131
Id. at 561.
132
Id.
133
Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (W.D.N.Y.
2005). The District Court for the Western District of New York did not offer a detailed discussion of the legislative history of RLUIPA but did explain that Congress
was likely unconcerned with eminent domain because congressional commentary
centered on zoning. See id. This Comment will present a thorough analysis of the
legislative history to bolster the court’s argument.
126
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regarding the law and its precursor bills, strengthens the conclusion
that Congress did not intend RLUIPA to cover eminent domain actions.
First, it is helpful to contrast the language of precursor bills to
the language ultimately codified in RLUIPA. The House and Senate
each introduced three bills, respectively, to address religious liberty
134
The Religious Liberty Protection Act of
issues post-City of Boerne.
135
1999 (RLPA 1999), H.R. 1691, the House’s second attempt at drafting religious liberty protection legislation, defined “land use regulation” as “a law or decision by a government that limits or restricts a
private person’s uses or development of land, or of structures affixed
136
to land.”
In RLUIPA, a “land use regulation” is defined as “a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or
restricts a claimant’s use or development of land (including a struc137
House Bill 1691 did not include the limitature affixed to land).”
tion to a “zoning or landmarking law,” which suggests that RLUIPA
was significantly narrowed to include only two specific types of restric138
tive practices.
Next, discussion of each precursor bill during introduction and
floor debate sheds light on congressional intent. For example, the
Congressional Record indicates that when RLUIPA, in its final draft version as Senate Bill 2869, was presented to the Senate for approval, the
bill’s land use provision was discussed solely in reference to zoning
139
laws.
For example, in a joint statement, Senators Hatch and Kennedy stressed that RLUIPA was necessary because “[c]hurches . . . are
134

The House bills include H.R. 4862, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000); H.R. 1691,
106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999); H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1998). The Senate
bills include S. 2869, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000); S. 2081, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess.
2000); S. 2148, 105th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1998).
135
Religious Liberty Protection Act 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999)
(as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 1, 1999).
136
Id. § 8(3). Senate Bill 2081, the Senate’s second attempt, included the same
definition of land use regulation, with minor grammatical variations. S. 2081, 106th
Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000). Interestingly, the first attempts by both the House and Senate did not include any definition of land use regulation. S. 2148, 105th Cong. (2nd
Sess. 1998); H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1998).
137
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2000). This narrower definition of land use regulation first appeared in H.R. 4862 and S. 2869, both introduced in July 2000.
138
See H.R. 1691; see also 146 CONG. REC. E 1563, 1563–64 (daily ed. Sept. 22,
2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). Rep. Canady provided a summary of each provision of RLUIPA on the day prior to the bill being signed into law by President Clinton. Id. Canady described the definition of land use regulation as “only zoning and
landmarking laws.” Id. at 1564. He also stated generally that RLUIPA was “patterned
after” H.R. 1691, “an, earlier, more expansive bill.” Id. at 1563 (emphasis added).
139
See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774–79 (daily ed. July 27, 2000).
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frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also
in the highly individualized and discretionary processes of land use
140
regulation.” The senators went on to explain this claim by offering
141
only examples of zoning codes.
As a more specific example of the
types of conduct RLUIPA sought to regulate, Senator Reid stated that
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints “maintain[ed] serious
reservations about non-uniform zoning regulations throughout the
country, which, though religiously-neutral on their face, have the effect of overly-restricting the size and location, among other things, of
142
This statement suggests that a major relichurches and temples.”
gious organization was primarily concerned with size and use restric143
Notably, the words “eminent domain”
tions—zoning regulations.
or “condemnation” were never mentioned during the presentation of
144
the bill.
Similarly, eminent domain is never mentioned in the
House Committee Report regarding H.R. 1691, and discussion is fo145
cused on zoning.
Both the Congressional Record regarding RLUIPA and the Committee Report regarding RLPA 1999 rely upon hearings before the
146
House of Representatives in reaction to City of Boerne v. Flores, which
provide evidence of potentially discriminatory application of land use
147
regulations to religious institutions.
The testimony provides evi148
For
dence of zoning practices challenged as unfairly burdensome.
example, land use attorney John Mauck presented the results of a
149
survey of twenty-nine zoning codes in the Chicago area.
Twelve of
these zoning codes did not allow a church to locate as of right with150
In ten codes, churches could locate only
out a special-use permit.

140

Id. at 7774 (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
Id. at 7774–75 (“Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places where
they permit theaters, meeting halls, and other places where large groups of people
assemble for secular purposes. Or the codes permit churches only with individualized permission from the zoning board, and zoning boards use that authority in discriminatory ways.”).
142
Id. at 7778.
143
See id.
144
See id. at 7774–79.
145
See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 1–42 (1999).
146
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
147
See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy); H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 18–24.
148
See, e.g., Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 100–01 (June 16, 1998) (statement
of John Mauck, Att’y), microformed on CIS No. 00:H521-10 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
149
Id.
150
Id.
141
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in residential neighborhoods, which is generally impractical.
This
study involved zoning codes, particularly location restrictions, but did
152
not investigate eminent domain actions.
Similarly, Von G. Keetch, Counsel to the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints, described a potentially problematic regulation of
religious property by the City of Forest Hills, Tennessee, in its Comprehensive Plan, which limited new development within the city to
153
This plan set up educational and religious
single-family homes.
zones, but limited that designation to already existing schools and
churches in the city, which essentially blocked the Church of Latter
154
Day Saints from building a new church in Forest Hills. Keetch also
relied upon a study conducted by faculty at Brigham Young University, which surveyed 196 cases that were categorized by the type of
155
zoning issue involved. Keetch introduced the study as follows:
Essentially, the zoning issues fall into two broad categories: cases
that involve zoning on property to permit a church building to be
erected on a particular site (“location cases”), and cases that determine whether an accessory use (such as a homeless shelter or
soup kitchen) may be allowed at the site of an existing church
156
(“accessory use cases”).

This study was directed toward zoning ordinances and their applica157
tion to religious property.
After reviewing every available hearing, the author of this Comment could locate only two references to eminent domain in the tes158
timony before Congress. Land use attorney Bruce Shoulson, testify151

Id.
Id.
153
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 26–28 (May 12, 1999) (statement of Von
G. Keetch, Counsel, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints), microformed on CIS
No. 00:H521-100 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
154
Id. at 27.
155
Id. at 22–23, 31–43.
156
Id. at 31.
157
See id. at 31–43.
158
See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 201 (July 14, 1998) (statement of
Bruce D. Shoulson, Att’y, Lowenstein Sandler, PC), microformed on CIS No. 00:H52110 (Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter Shoulson testimony]; Protecting Religious Freedom
After Boerne v. Flores (Part III): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 19 (Mar. 26, 1998) (statement of Mark E.
Chopko, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Catholic Conference), microformed on CIS No. 99:H52134 (Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter Chopko testimony]. The extensive testimony
spans nine hearings before Congress. For a complete list of the hearings and respective testimony, see the Appendix to this Comment.
152
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ing before the House Judiciary Committee on the Constitution, presented evidence of how zoning ordinances burdened Orthodox Jews
159
He related one example where eminent
in Northern New Jersey.
domain was eventually utilized by the municipality to take land away
from a religious institution:
[O]ne community, in an effort to head off a zoning battle over
the conversion to an ultra-Orthodox synagogue and relating Yeshiva program of buildings which had previously been used by a
house of worship, instituted eminent domain proceedings with
respect to the subject property on the suddenly conveniently discovered grounds that specific property was needed for a new mu160
nicipal complex.

Although the battle ultimately ended in condemnation, it was the
culmination of a long zoning dispute. In his discussion of substantial
burdens on religious property, Mark E. Chopko, General Counsel of
the United States Catholic Conference, mentioned anecdotally that
“some of our dioceses report conflicts over the loss of land by eminent domain for such things as creation of bicycle paths or parking
161
Chopko did not relate any specific instances of litigation inlots.”
162
This brief menvolving religious property and eminent domain.
tion of eminent domain was located amidst discussion of landmark163
ing and limitations on hours of operation and congregation size.
Furthermore, following each session of testimony, the witnesses
164
were questioned as a group by the presiding congressmen.
There
165
was no questioning following Shoulson’s testimony, and Chopko
was not asked to elaborate on his mention of eminent domain; it did
166
not trigger a reaction by the legislators.
It would be unsound to
conclude that “zoning and landmarking law” covers eminent domain
based on two brief mentions of eminent domain in extensive testimony clearly focused on zoning.

159

Shoulson testimony, supra note 158, at 201.
Id.
161
Chopko testimony, supra note 158, at 19.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 18–19.
164
See, e.g., Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 234–42 (July 14, 1998), microformed
on CIS No. 00:H521-10 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
165
See id.
166
Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part III): Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 84–94 (Mar. 26,
1998), microformed on CIS No. 99:H521-34 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
160
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C. Fundamental Differences Between the Bases of Power of Eminent
Domain and Zoning and Landmarking Laws
Faith Temple Church, St. John’s, and Sherman all held that RLUIPA
does not cover all eminent domain actions because the statute clearly
167
defines “land use regulation” as a “zoning or landmarking law.”
The courts in these cases noted the fundamental differences between
eminent domain and zoning or landmarking laws just by comparing
the common definitions of the terms: eminent domain is a taking of
168
land, whereas zoning and landmarking are restrictions of land use.
While the common definitions of these terms aptly mark the distinction, there are other theories that demonstrate that eminent domain
and zoning and landmarking laws are fundamentally different government actions.
Unlike zoning, eminent domain is not part of the state’s police
169
power. Eminent domain and the police power are different:
[L]aws enacted in the proper exercise of police power, which are
reasonably necessary for the preservation of the public health,
safety, and morals, even though they result in the impairment of
the full use of property by the owner thereof, do not ordinarily
constitute a “taking of private property” within the meaning of the
170
constitutional provisions of federal and state governments.

In his dissent in Kelo v. City of New London, Justice Thomas noted that
eminent domain is not founded in the state’s police power: “The
question whether the State can take property using the power of
eminent domain is therefore distinct from the question whether it
can regulate property pursuant to the police power. . . . To construe
the Public Use Clause to overlap with the States’ police power con171
flates these two categories.” In the landmark case Village of Euclid v.

167

Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (W.D.N.Y.
2005); St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887,
899 (N.D. Ill. 2005); City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman, 129 P.3d 542, 561 (Haw.
2006).
168
Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254–55; St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at
899–900; Sherman, 129 P.3d at 561.
169
See William A. McClain, Modern Concepts of Police Power and Eminent Domain,
INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 9, 187 (Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1969). The
police power “describe[s] the right of government to regulate the conduct of people
in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare.” Id. at 166; see also RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 112 (1985)
(“The sole function of the police power is to protect individual liberty and private
property against all manifestations of force and fraud.”).
170
McClain, supra note 169, at 187.
171
545 U.S. 469, 519–20 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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172

Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court stated that the zoning ordinance at issue, which created use districts to separate industrial from
residential and other commercial uses, was asserted under the police
173
power. Zoning, in general, was a constitutional practice, as long as
the ordinance was not “arbitrary and unreasonable, [that is] having
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
174
welfare.” When an individual purchases a parcel of land, he knows
that he must use the land in such a way that it does not interfere with
the rights of others, and such use is rightly policed by the state, with175
However, the private property owner does not
out compensation.
as readily expect the taking of his property for public use, so the gov176
Thus, eminent domain
ernment must compensate for the taking.
(an independent government power) and zoning (a state police
power) are fundamentally different government actions.
Another distinction between eminent domain and zoning is provided by cases in which the eminent domain power overrides a limitation set by zoning law. Several courts have exempted government entities from compliance with zoning regulations if the entity uses its
power of eminent domain to acquire lands for government pro177
178
jects. For example, in City of Washington v. Warren County, the city
wanted to make improvements to its airport, but an amendment to
the zoning ordinance prohibited any expansion because the airport
179
The Supreme Court of Misproperty was located in a flood plain.
souri determined that the city could pursue its plan, immune from
180
the zoning ordinance.
The court applied the “power of eminent
domain” test: “[I]f a power has its source in the constitution, although delegated by statute, then it prevails over and cannot be limited by another government entity’s power, such as zoning, that is
172

272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 387.
174
Id. at 395.
175
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (holding that a coal company, which was forbidden by state law to mine coal in such a way that would cause
subsidence, was entitled to just compensation for the taking of its property) (“As
long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to the police power.”); see also Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
176
See Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415 (“[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”); see also Kelo,
545 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
177
See Elaine Marie Tomko-DeLuca, Annotation, Applicability of Zoning Regulations
to Governmental Projects or Activities, 53 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1997, updated Dec. 2005).
178
899 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. 1995).
179
Id. at 864.
180
Id. at 867.
173
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delegated solely by statute and without any specific constitutional au181
While the power of eminent domain was set forth in the
thority.”
Missouri Constitution, the city’s zoning authority was established only
182
by statute.
In Seward County Board of Commissioners v. City of Sew183
ard, the Supreme Court of Nebraska also upheld the city’s creation
of an airport on condemned property, despite a contrary zoning or184
dinance, by applying the power of eminent domain test.
Interestingly, the court noted that “[i]t has frequently been stated that the
power of eminent domain is inherently superior to the exercise of the
185
zoning power.” Whether based on the theory that eminent domain
is inherently superior to zoning or that it trumps zoning power under
certain circumstances, the notion that government projects facilitated
by acquisition of land via condemnation need not always be subject to
zoning regulations adds strength to the distinction between the two
government powers. If eminent domain can supersede zoning regulations, clearly the powers are not one and the same.
Recent case law, legislative history, and theories behind the
power of eminent domain all support the conclusion that eminent
domain does not fall within the scope of RLUIPA’s application.
Commentators reaching the opposite conclusion have difficulty challenging this direct evidence. Shelley Ross Saxer, Associate Dean of
Academics and Professor at Pepperdine University School of Law,
and prominent scholar in the land use context, concludes that
RLUIPA covers eminent domain by suggesting that some courts have
186
She cites Vinebroadly interpreted the term “land use regulation.”
187
yard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston, which
held that the city’s refusal to amend a zoning ordinance was an act
taken pursuant to a zoning law, creating jurisdiction under
188
She also cites Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning ComRLUIPA.
189
mission, which treated a state land use classification system as a zon181

Id. at 866 (citing City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset Hills, 589 S.W.2d 31, 42
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979)). Some jurisdictions apply a “balancing of the interests” test
where the zoning power is constitutionally authorized. Id. (citing St. Louis v. City of
Bridgeton, 705 S.W.2d 524, 529 (Mo. App. Ct. 1985)). The test requires analysis of
the public interests implicated in the particular land use dispute. City of Bridgeton,
705 S.W.2d at 529.
182
City of Washington, 899 S.W.2d at 867.
183
242 N.W.2d 849 (Neb. 1976).
184
Id. at 850–55.
185
Id. at 854.
186
Saxer, supra note 85, at 668–70.
187
250 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
188
Saxer, supra note 85, at 669 (citing Vineyard, 250 F. Supp. at 990).
189
229 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Haw. 2002).
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190

ing law. However, these cases do not even hint that “land use regulation” can be interpreted so broadly as to include eminent domain, a
191
Saxer then arfundamentally different type of government power.
gues that Cottonwood held that eminent domain is not a zoning law,
but an application of a zoning law, which is within the scope of
192
She believes that any eminent domain action can be
RLUIPA.
traced to a zoning system; thus, eminent domain is an application of
193
the zoning law.
However, recent case law has questioned Cottonwood’s treatment
194
of eminent domain as an application of zoning. Another commentator concedes that the legislative history of RLUIPA does not suggest
195
any concern over eminent domain. He finds fault with the decision
in Faith Temple Church that a connection between zoning regulations
196
and eminent domain is too attenuated to bear any weight. But this
decision has not been overruled or questioned in the courts. At the
very least, the possible, though highly attenuated, connection between eminent domain and zoning should be analyzed further by the
courts of appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States before
RLUIPA is interpreted to cover eminent domain.
Faith Temple Church, St. John’s, and Sherman have not been reversed. In fact, the district court ruling in St. John’s that RLUIPA does
not cover eminent domain has been affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.
The legislative history shows that eminent domain was not the focus
for reform; in fact, it was only mentioned twice throughout the entire
course of congressional discussion regarding proposed religious liberty legislation. The rules of statutory construction require a statute
to be interpreted with regard to its common meaning, altered only if
such a common meaning would be contradictory to congressional in197
tent.
Interpreting RLUIPA to cover eminent domain is unsupported by the language of the statute, congressional intent, and the

190

Saxer, supra note 85, at 669 (citing Hale O Kaula, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1070).
See id.
192
Id. at 670.
193
Id.
194
See supra notes 108–10, 114–16, 123 and accompanying text.
195
G. David Mathues, Note, Shadow of a Bulldozer?: RLUIPA and Eminent Domain
After Kelo, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1665, 1667 (2006).
196
Id. at 1667.
197
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (“Therefore, we look to
the legislative history to determine only whether there is ‘clearly expressed legislative
intention’ contrary to that language, which would require us to question the strong
presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses.”).
191
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basic distinctions between eminent domain and zoning and landmarking laws.
IV. RLUIPA SHOULD NOT BE
AMENDED TO COVER EMINENT DOMAIN
Senator Edward Kennedy, one of the architects of RLUIPA, is
considering an amendment to RLUIPA to include eminent domain
198
actions within the statute’s purview.
Senator Kennedy circulated a
“Dear Colleague” letter and draft bill to fellow senators, proposing
that eminent domain be included within the definition of land use
199
The amendment would subject proposed condemnaregulation.
200
tions of religious property to strict scrutiny review.
For the reasons discussed throughout this Part, Congress should
reject Senator Kennedy’s proposed amendment to RLUIPA, or any
similar efforts to include eminent domain within the statute’s coverage. Under current free exercise jurisprudence, a neutral, generally
applicable state or local law outside of the land use or prison contexts, such as a prohibition on possession of controlled substances,
that incidentally burdens religious exercise is only subject to rational
201
basis scrutiny; a law requiring an individualized assessment, such as
an ordinance directly regulating religious animal sacrifice, is subject
202
RLUIPA classifies all applications of zoning and
to strict scrutiny.
landmarking laws as individualized assessments because religious discrimination frequently underlies the particularized examination and
203
evaluation of religious property.
RLUIPA’s definition of “individualized assessment” may capture
zoning and landmarking laws, but does not encompass eminent domain. Eminent domain cannot be characterized as an individualized
assessment because it does not involve the same scrutiny of individual
parcels of land, and thus would not be subject to strict scrutiny re204
view. However, RLUIPA also applies strict scrutiny review to a land
198

E-mail from Jim Walsh, Staffer for Sen. Edward Kennedy, Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, to author (Sept. 29, 2006, 18:38:07 EST) (on file with author).
199
Marci Hamilton, Churches and Eminent Domain: A Move in Congress to Once Again
Make Churches Privileged Landowners, Aug. 10, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
hamilton/20060810.html.
200
Id.
201
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874–78 (1990).
202
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–
43 (1993).
203
146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774–75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
204
See infra Part IV.A.2.
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use law or government action that imposes a substantial burden on
205
If the language
religion, and in turn, affects interstate commerce.
of RLUIPA were amended to include eminent domain as a land use
regulation, this Commerce Clause provision could be construed to
encompass all eminent domain actions against religious property, de206
This automatic
spite being a generally applied government power.
application of strict scrutiny to eminent domain is contrary to precedent and would unnecessarily limit an important government
207
power.
Not only does Senator Kennedy’s proposed amendment conflict
with current law, but it also would provide an extraneous remedy, because those eminent domain actions that are truly discriminatory can
be challenged under a regular free exercise claim or an equal protec208
tion claim. Furthermore, Senator Kennedy’s proposal is unwise because it could extend the unnecessary protection against condemna209
tions to auxiliary uses of religious property.
A. Eminent Domain Is a Generally Applicable Law, Thus It Cannot
Be Subject to Strict Scrutiny
1.

The Distinction Between Generally Applicable Laws
and Individualized Assessments

As discussed in Part II, making the distinction between a law requiring individualized assessment and a neutral, generally applicable
law is vital to a free exercise claim because it will determine the level
of scrutiny a court must apply to the challenged law or government
210
action.
The Supreme Court set forth this vital distinction in Em211
ployment Division v. Smith and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
212
City of Hialeah. These cases established the rule that a generally ap213
A generally applicable law is subject only to rational basis review.
205

See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
207
See infra Part IV.
208
See infra Part IV.B.
209
See infra Part IV.C.
210
See supra Part II.
211
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
212
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
213
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–90. The Court noted that strict scrutiny review was
applied to instances where the “State has in place a system of individual exemptions,”
but these instances were unemployment compensation and welfare benefits cases,
where delivery of benefits required an evaluation of the individual’s religious motivation for refusing or quitting work. Id. at 883–85 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
206
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plicable law applies across the board; it does not target religious activ214
It may capture some religious acity because of its religious nature.
215
On the
tivity, but this is incidental to the primary goal of the law.
other hand, an individualized assessment involves an evaluation of
the religious purpose or basis for the conduct and can result in dif216
An individuferent treatment because of the religious purpose or basis.
alized assessment requires strict scrutiny review because it involves a
direct analysis and/or regulation of religious activity, which runs a
217
greater risk of offending the right to free exercise of religion.
The facts of Smith and Lukumi illustrate the difference between a
neutral, generally applicable law and an individualized assessment.
In Smith, the Oregon law prohibiting use of peyote was a generally
218
However, in Lukumi, the challenged law was found
applicable law.
219
In Lukumi, a Santeria church
to be an individualized assessment.
220
announced its plan to open a place of worship in Hialeah, Florida.
The Santeria faith conducts religious ceremonies that involve the sac221
The City of Hialeah passed a resolution that prorifice of animals.
hibited the sacrifice of animals, defined as the unnecessary killing of
708 (1986)). In Smith, Justice Scalia suggested that the application of a generally applicable law to religious activity could be subject to strict scrutiny review by asserting a
hybrid rights theory. Id. at 881–82. When a claimant brings a challenge under the
Free Exercise Clause “in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech and of the press,” the court must apply strict scrutiny review to
the government action or statute. Id. at 881. The Court offered Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), as an example of a hybrid rights situation. Smith, 494 U.S. at
881. In Yoder, an Amish claimant asserted parental rights in addition to a free exercise claim in challenging compulsory school attendance laws. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207,
213–14. A hybrid rights claim was not at issue in Smith. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. However, the courts of appeals are split as to whether or not the hybrid rights theory is
valid. A few circuits apply strict scrutiny when free exercise claims are brought in
conjunction with other constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy and
Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 534 n.7 (1st Cir. 1995); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202,
1207–08 (9th Cir. 1996); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694,
699–700 (10th Cir. 1998). Other circuits have refused to recognize the theory. See,
e.g., Knight v. Conn. Dept. of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001) (“the
language [in Smith] relating to hybrid claims is dicta and not binding on this court”);
Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993). Thus an
attempt to invoke strict scrutiny review of an eminent domain proceeding against religious property by utilizing the hybrid rights theory (property interests in conjunction with a free exercise claim) would rest on shaky ground.
214
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–33, 542–43; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79.
215
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–32; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
216
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533, 542–43; Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78.
217
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542–43, 547.
218
See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
219
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534–40.
220
Id. at 525–26.
221
Id. at 524–25.
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an animal for ritual purposes and not primarily for consumption.
Although the city claimed that the resolution was designed to promote public health and prevent cruelty to animals, many other types
223
of non-religious slaughter were permitted. Since the city passed the
ordinance against animal slaughtering with the purpose of suppressing
the religious practice of the Santeria church, the ordinance was not a
224
neutral, generally applicable law. Thus, the Court determined that
the ordinance involved an individualized assessment:
Further, because [the ordinance] requires an evaluation of the
particular justification for the killing, this ordinance represents a
system of individualized governmental assessment of the reasons
for the relevant conduct. . . . Respondent’s application of the ordinance’s test of necessity devalues religious reasons for killing by
judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons.
Thus, religious practice is being singled out for discriminatory
225
treatment.

RLUIPA applies when a substantial burden results from the imposition of a land use regulation “under which a government makes,
or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the pro226
posed uses for the property involved.” Under RLUIPA, “individualized assessment” means the use of discretion by zoning officials to
apply zoning regulations to some real property or grant deviations
227
Thus, the Act’s heightened scrutiny will
from the set regulations.
come into play whenever a religious institution presents a property
issue that is subject to the locality’s particularized review, even absent
a showing that the government intended to discriminate against the
228
religious landowner.
An individualized assessment under RLUIPA,
such as a decision whether to grant a special use permit to a church,
229
For example, a
may not be motivated necessarily by religious bias.
222

Id. at 526–28.
Id. at 543–44.
224
Id. at 540–42.
225
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537–38 (internal quotation omitted).
226
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2000) (emphasis added). Congress included the
narrow requirement that the burden result from an individualized assessment in order to legislate within the scope of its power under the Enforcement Clause. H.R.
REP. NO. 106-219, at 17 (1999); Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 949 (2001).
227
See Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203,
1222–23 (2002); Storzer & Picarello, supra note 226, at 949–52.
228
Storzer & Picarello, supra note 226, at 949–51; Graff, supra note 56, at 515.
229
Graff, supra note 56, at 515.
223
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zoning official’s decision to deny a church a zoning variance to expand its facilities may simply result from a zoning scheme designed to
230
However, the
maintain the consistency of uses in a neighborhood.
legislative history of RLUIPA suggests that zoning and landmarking
decisions adverse to religious property often result from underlying,
though not overt, discrimination, especially in the context of special
231
use permits and variances. It suggests that zoning and landmarking
decisions based on discrimination occur frequently enough that all
232
individualized assessments of property require closer scrutiny.
Therefore, under RLUIPA, the application of a zoning or landmarking law to a particular piece of religious property constitutes an
individualized assessment. Since this particularized consideration of
religious property often results in discriminatory treatment because
of the religious nature of the land use, the Smith rule for generally
applicable laws does not apply, and the assessment is subject to strict
scrutiny review. While RLUIPA may properly classify the application
of zoning and land use laws as individualized assessments, deserving
of heightened protection, it cannot similarly classify eminent domain.
2.

Eminent Domain Does Not Involve the Same
Individualized Assessment Techniques as Zoning

Eminent domain is not an individualized assessment, but rather
an action taken pursuant to generally applicable law. A condemnation action does not require the same consideration of the characteristics of an individual parcel of land involved in the application of
zoning laws. Thus, eminent domain is not the type of action targeted
by RLUIPA’s “individualized assessment” language.
The government’s power to condemn is a sovereign right, lim233
ited by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the states’
234
respective constitutional provisions.
A governmental entity takes
private property for a public use and pays just compensation to the
235
Typically, the entity conceives of a particular use
former owner.
236
and selects a location for construction.
The government can exercise its power of eminent domain to take virtually any type of prop230

See id.
146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774–75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
232
Id.
233
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
234
See 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.14[2] (Matthew Bender, 3d ed., 2006).
235
See id.
236
See, e.g., St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d
887, 890–91 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
231
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erty in that location, so long as the public use requirement is satis237
238
For example, in St. John’s, the City of Chicago needed to
fied.
expand O’Hare International Airport—a public use—and selected a
239
parcel of adjoining land to construct additional runways.
A ceme240
There was no evidence that the city would
tery stood in the way.
have abandoned its construction plans if a private home or business
was located in the target area, or that the city selected the parcel with
241
Certainly, in sethe specific goal of eliminating religious property.
lecting a location for the public use, the government entity exercising
its eminent domain power observes the private property standing in
242
its way. However, this is typically in furtherance of a general review
of the overall location and the need for the new use to be constructed
243
on that particular site.
In contrast, traditional zoning serves to regulate property to
244
maintain conformity with a general scheme.
Local government
creates a comprehensive plan, which sets out the standard for development and empowers the entity to establish regulations and restrictions on aspects of property, such as the size of structures, and to di245
The entity also reviews propertyvide the area into use districts.
246
Essentially,
holders’ requests for variances to the general scheme.
zoning sets up a master plan to ensure the co-existence of different
land uses and to maintain at least some degree of conformity of ap247
Once this plan is established, it is necessary to ensure
pearance.

237

See McClain, supra note 169, at 186.
401 F. Supp. 2d 887.
239
Id. at 889–91.
240
Id. at 890.
241
Id. at 898.
242
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473–75 (2005); St. John’s,
401 F. Supp. 2d at 889–91.
243
See, e.g., 1A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 234, § 3.03[2][b] (citing
Unif. Eminent Domain Code § 310(a) (1974)); THOMAS F. GESSELBRACHT ET AL.,
ILLINOIS ZONING, EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND USE MANUAL § 9-3(c)(1)–(3) (1998 &
LexisNexis online Supp. 2005); Edward D. McKirdy et al., New Jersey Condemnation
Practice, 2003 N.J. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. § 1.4.5.
244
See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA: A LEGAL STRATEGY FOR URBAN
CHANGE 57 (1971) (citing A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (rev. ed.
1926)). The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was adopted by all fifty states and
still remains in effect in many states. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY
971 (5th ed. 2002). It serves as the basis for modern zoning ordinances. See id. at
971–72.
245
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 244, at 971–72.
246
MANDELKER, supra note 244, at 66–67.
247
See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 244, at 971–72 (citing A STATE STANDARD
ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3).
238
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adherence to the master plan by individual property-holders.
Obviously, this can only be accomplished by carefully reviewing problematic use and proposed development of individual parcels of
249
land.
In its application of the zoning laws, the government evaluates
how the land is used or will be used by the current property owner—
250
what RLUIPA deems an individualized assessment.
This consideration of the current property owner’s present use or planned change
in use is not the government’s primary consideration when it initiates
251
The government is
an action to take land via eminent domain.
concerned with physical location and its suitability for the post252
condemnation use of the property.
Also, the different bases of power for eminent domain and zoning, respectively, show that eminent domain does not involve the type
of individual review involved in zoning. Pursuant to the power of
eminent domain,
property . . . is taken from the owner and applied to public use
because the use or enjoyment of such property . . . is beneficial to
the public. In the exercise of the police power [as in zoning] the
owner is denied the unrestricted use or enjoyment of his property, or his property is taken from him because his use or enjoy253
ment of such property is injurious to the public welfare.

Eminent domain does not involve the scrutiny of individual parcels of
land to protect against encroachments on the rights of others because it is not an exercise of the state’s police power. Rather, eminent domain serves to take property that stands in the way of a
planned project.
To further emphasize why eminent domain should not be considered an individualized assessment subject to strict scrutiny, emi254
nent domain in general is reviewed under rational basis scrutiny.
As explained in Part II in the discussion of Kelo v. City of New London,
legislatures are accorded deference to determine what constitutes a
255
Nothing in the relevant case law suggests that a legislapublic use.
248

See id. at 984–85 (citing A STATE STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7).
See id.
250
See id. at 971–72; see also 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1.7 (Edward H. Zeigler, Jr., ed., Thomson
West 2005) (1956); supra note 227 and accompanying text.
251
See supra note 243.
252
See supra note 243.
253
1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 234, § 1.42[2].
254
See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
255
See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
249
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ture is further limited in selecting the type of private property to be
256
There is certainly no
condemned to effectuate the public use.
qualification within this case law that legislatures must tip-toe around
257
religious property.
Therefore, equating eminent domain with the
type of individualized assessment envisaged under RLUIPA exposes
eminent domain to the highest scrutiny, which is clearly inconsistent
258
with precedent.
In addition to a land use regulation involving an individualized
assessment, RLUIPA also applies when the government-imposed substantial burden affects a program that receives federal funding or affects interstate commerce, even when this burden results from a law
259
of general applicability.
The reason is that, in addition to the Enforcement Clause, the statute also has its basis in the Spending
260
261
Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitu262
tion.
Under the Commerce Clause provision, an effect on interstate commerce is shown when the “burden prevents a specific economic transaction in commerce, such as a construction project,
purchase or rental of a building, or an interstate shipment of reli256

See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
257
See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. 469; Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229; Berman, 348 U.S. 26.
258
See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. 469; Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229; Berman, 348 U.S. 26. Exactions are subject to more stringent review than rational basis scrutiny. Nicole Stelle
Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 937
(2003). An exaction is valid if two tests are met: (1) the condition is substantially related to the government’s objective, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825,
835–37 (1987); and (2) the nature and scope of the condition are roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed development, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 388 (1994). Commentators have suggested that a similar test should be applied
to eminent domain actions instead of rational basis review. Garnett, supra, at 937.
This higher scrutiny would require the government to “demonstrate that a given exercise of eminent domain was ‘reasonably necessary’ to advance, or ‘related in nature
and extent’ to, the public purpose for which the condemnation power was invoked.”
Garnett, supra, at 964; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986). It is also important to note that regulatory takings are
reviewed under different tests than eminent domain. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
259
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2000).
260
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States . . . .”).
261
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes
. . . .”).
262
146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). This Comment will not review the Spending Clause provision because it is less applicable to the land use provisions of RLUIPA. See H.R.
REP. NO. 106-219, at 14–15 (1999).
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263

gious goods.”
This provision appears to capture the application of
zoning regulations that effectively prevent a church from expanding
264
It has
its facilities or putting purchased property to religious use.
also been suggested that the Commerce Clause provision captures
eminent domain actions not only because the government will redevelop the existing property, but because the church will also purchase
265
or construct a new church building, which generates commerce.
This Commerce Clause hook is effectively a catch-all provision
because it applies to all substantial burdens resulting from the imposition of land use regulations that affect interstate commerce, even
266
burdens resulting from generally applicable laws. As previously discussed, eminent domain is not a land use regulation as defined under
RLUIPA, so the Commerce Clause hook does not apply under the
current language of RLUIPA. However, if RLUIPA was amended to
include eminent domain within the definition of land use regulation,
the Commerce Clause hook would encompass eminent domain because eminent domain always involves redevelopment and construc267
tion—activities that affect interstate commerce.
In effect, this
would create a strangle-hold on the government’s use of its eminent
domain power to acquire religious property. As previously men268
The
tioned, eminent domain is subject to rational basis scrutiny.
legislature is accorded deference to determine whether the land is
269
The automatic application of strict
being taken for the public use.
scrutiny review to every eminent domain action against religious
263

146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
264
See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 58 (June 16, 1998) (statement of Marc
D. Stern, Dir., Legal Dept., American Jewish Cong.), microformed on CIS No. 00:H52110 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
The Almanac also reports that religious congregations had current operating expenditures of 41 billion dollars. Some of the difference is no
doubt savings or reserves, but much of the rest is no doubt spent on
capital improvements—new buildings and upgrading old ones, a fact
which makes RLPA's zoning provisions quite important. To the extent
that localities interfere with the ability of religious institutions to build,
they reduce the amount of commerce in construction—much of which
involves the interstate movement of goods (stained glass, furnishings)
and services.
Id. (citing VIRGINIA ANN HODGKINSON, NOT-FOR-PROFIT ALMANAC 1996–1997: DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR 175 (1996)).
265
Mathues, supra note 195, at 1663.
266
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2000).
267
See Mathues, supra note 195, at 1663.
268
See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
269
See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.

FINETTI_FINALV2

700

4/2/2008 6:02:38 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:667

property is contrary to precedent and would severely limit an inher270
ent governmental power.
Therefore, Senator Kennedy’s proposed amendment to include
eminent domain within RLUIPA directly conflicts with the language
and the purpose of the statute. Eminent domain is an action taken
pursuant to generally applicable law. Eminent domain is not an individualized assessment, because the government does not apply the
same level of scrutiny of a parcel of land that is involved in zoning or
landmarking. The legislative history reveals that Congress was particularly concerned with zoning issues such as special use permits and
variances, which provide a greater opportunity for religious discrimination than does the condemnation of whole tracts of land for the
public use. Applying strict scrutiny review to eminent domain actions, whether authorized by the “individualized assessment” basis or
the Commerce Clause catch-all provision, is inconsistent with current
takings jurisprudence.
B. Religious Institutions Do Not Need RLUIPA to Pursue Challenges
to Allegedly Discriminatory Eminent Domain Actions
If RLUIPA is not amended to include eminent domain, religious
institutions suspecting that their properties are being unfairly targeted would still have legal recourse. They could bring claims under
271
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal
272
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provide
sufficient protection against condemnation actions based on religious
animus.
1.

Free Exercise Claim

A religious institution whose property is targeted by eminent
domain can claim that the condemnation restricted its religious prac273
tice. Under prevailing free exercise law, a generally applicable state
270

See McClain, supra note 169, at 183–84 (“The power of eminent domain does
not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution; it is inherent in
sovereignty and exists in a sovereign government without recognition thereof in the
constitution.”); see also Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 40, 42 (June 16, 1998)
(statement of Marci A. Hamilton, Professor, Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, Yeshiva Univ.), microformed on CIS No. 00:H521-10 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (arguing
that the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4019, another precursor to
RLUIPA, would federalize local land use law, one of the last remaining strongholds
of local government).
271
See infra Part IV.B.1.
272
See infra Part IV.B.2.
273
U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1; see supra Part III.A.
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or local law (outside the land use or institutional contexts set forth
under RLUIPA) that produces an incidental burden on religious
practice is only subject to rational basis review, while a non-neutral
274
A non-neutral law is one that spelaw is subject to strict scrutiny.
cifically targets the religious practice or property because it is reli275
While eminent domain is a generally applicable
gious in nature.
law, inevitably some eminent domain actions will seek to condemn
276
religious property because it is religious.
A condemnation based on
discriminatory motive will be subject to strict scrutiny and will be
halted by the courts if the condemnation fails to satisfy the state’s
compelling interest, or is not narrowly tailored to meet that compel277
ling interest.
If amended to include eminent domain, RLUIPA would subject
all eminent domain actions that impose a substantial burden on religious practice to strict scrutiny review under RLUIPA’s Commerce
278
As previously discussed, automatic strict scrutiny
Clause provision.
review is unwarranted in light of current free exercise jurisprudence,
eminent domain jurisprudence, and the very nature of eminent do279
A garden-variety free exercise claim is ample protection
main.
against a truly discriminatory exercise of eminent domain power and
is consistent with the law.
2.

Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its juris280
diction the equal protection of the laws.”
The Equal Protection
Clause protects against purely discriminatory or unjustified distinc281
tions between people and preserves fundamental rights.
A party can challenge the government’s use of eminent domain
against its private property as contrary to the Equal Protection Clause

274

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–
47 (1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–90 (1990).
275
See supra notes 216–25 and accompanying text.
276
See supra Part IV.A.1.
277
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral
or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. . . . A law
that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict
scrutiny only in rare cases.”); see also supra Part IV.A.1.
278
See supra notes 263–67 and accompanying text.
279
See supra Part IV.A.
280
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
281
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 642.
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on the ground that the government condemned the property in a
282
In Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, Inc. v.
discriminatory manner.
283
Mayor & Council of Essex Fells, Kessler, which runs a rehabilitation
facility for the disabled, purchased a tract of land in Essex Fells, New
284
Jersey, for an additional health care and nurse training facility.
Kessler approached the Borough Planning Board seeking an
amendment to the zoning ordinance, which zoned this tract for edu285
cational use. It had previously been owned by the Northeastern Bi286
When Kessler’s request was met with public disfavor,
ble College.
the Planning Board decided to condemn the property in order to
287
preserve it as an open space. Kessler challenged the condemnation
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for discrimination
288
against disabled persons.
The Kessler case demonstrates that a party can pursue an equal
protection claim for a discriminatory application of eminent domain
289
power.
Thus, it follows that a religious institution which perceives
its property is being unfairly targeted for condemnation may challenge the action as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Religious institutions that have brought RLUIPA claims have also brought
290
291
For example, in St. John’s, the plaintiff
equal protection claims.
religious institution argued that the city discriminated against it be-

282

See Kessler Inst. for Rehab., Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Essex Fells, 876 F. Supp.
641 (D.N.J. 1995).
283
Id.
284
Id. at 647–48.
285
Id. at 648.
286
Id.
287
Id. at 649.
288
Kessler, 876 F. Supp. at 648. At this stage of the proceeding, the court denied
defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ discrimination claims under the state and
federal constitutions. Id. at 665. Kessler also filed a motion to dismiss the borough’s
condemnation proceeding in state court. Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Inst. for
Rehab., 673 A.2d 856, 858 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995). The court dismissed the
Borough’s condemnation complaint on the ground that it was filed in bad faith—the
asserted public interest in using the land for a park was mere pretext for opposing
Kessler’s presence in the community. Id. at 861, 863. Despite its successes, Kessler
ultimately decided to sell the property to the borough for use as a recreational space.
See Rachelle Garbarine, For Abandoned Campuses, Recycled Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
1996, § 9, at 1.
289
Kessler, 876 F. Supp. at 662–63.
290
See St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887,
891–92 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 1203, 1218 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
291
401 F. Supp. 2d 887; see supra Part III.
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cause the O’Hare Modernization Act (OMA), which authorized the
city to exercise its powers to expand the airport, exempted its ceme293
tery from state religious freedom protections. The plaintiff claimed
that all other religious institutions in the state were fully protected;
thus, St. John’s cemetery was singled out for discriminatory treat294
The court determined that the language of the OMA did
ment.
not single out the St. John’s property, but applied to all properties
295
within the planned development site. The Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court’s ruling as to St. John’s equal protection claim, emphasizing that there was no evidence that the OMA specifically targeted religious property, especially given the fact that other religious
296
cemeteries were left untouched by the condemnation plan.
The intensity of review afforded a government action challenged
as an equal protection violation will vary depending on the type of
297
claim at issue.
Generally, government classifications will be valid if
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, that is, if the classifica298
Heightened scrutiny is applied
tions satisfy rational basis scrutiny.
only to classifications against suspect classes, such as race, national
origin, and gender, and classifications that invade fundamental
299
300
rights. Freedom of religion is considered a fundamental right.
As is often the case, a religious group will challenge an eminent
domain action against its property using an equal protection violation
claim based on the same ground as a free exercise or RLUIPA
claim—the condemnation interfered with the group’s fundamental
301
If the free exercise claim is unsuccessright to religious exercise.
292

O’Hare Modernization Act, 620 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65-15 (West 1993 &
Supp. 2006).
293
St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 891, 901. The OMA amended the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act to prevent the heightened protections afforded religious groups from interfering with Chicago’s authority to relocate cemeteries standing in the way of the proposed runway expansion project. Id. at 891.
294
Id. at 901.
295
Id.
296
St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, No. 05-4418, 2007 U.S.
App. LEXIS 21914, at *48–50 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007).
297
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 645.
298
See id. at 645–46.
299
See id. at 645, 649.
300
Id. at 762. Other fundamental rights include family-rearing, procreation, sexual activity, health care decision-making, travel, voting, access to the courts, and certain criminal procedure protections. Id.
301
See Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282 n.5 (1st Cir. 2005). In Wirzburger,
plaintiffs challenged a Massachusetts constitutional provision prohibiting public financial support for private schools, including religiously affiliated schools. Id. at 274.
However, plaintiffs were prohibited from amending this constitutional provision by
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ful—that is, there is no free exercise problem because the government’s use of eminent domain was a neutral action, imposing only an
incidental burden—the related equal protection claim will be re302
So, even though the governviewed under rational basis scrutiny.
ment’s interference with the fundamental right to religious exercise
is ordinarily accorded strict scrutiny review, the interference need
only satisfy rational basis scrutiny when it is the product of a generally
applicable law—when it poses no free exercise violation. Thus, when
a court finds a challenged condemnation to be a neutral government
action under Smith and Lukumi, the condemnation lacks the discriminatory motivation that would ordinarily subject it to strict scrutiny under the equal protection analysis.
In St. John’s, the equal protection claim was reviewed under rational basis scrutiny because the plaintiff’s free exercise claim failed—
303
the condemnation action was neutral and generally applicable.
The Seventh Circuit decision clarified this reasoning: “St. John’s first
tries to repackage its free exercise argument in equal protection language, by claiming that the [OMA restriction on Illinois religious
freedom protections] unduly burdens its fundamental right freely to
exercise its religion. We have already rejected the underlying point,
304
The court determined that there was no equal protechowever.”
tion violation for the same reason that there was no free exercise violation—Chicago did not target St. John’s property because it was reli305
It affirmed the lower court’s determination that
gious property.
Chicago’s plan to condemn the cemetery was rationally related to its
306
interest in expanding the airport.
public initiative because their argument was directed toward religious schools. Id. at
274–75. Plaintiffs challenged this prohibition as a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause on the ground that the state substantially burdens religious exercise when it
creates a political process, but excludes some people from accessing that process. Id.
at 280. Plaintiffs also argued that the provision restricted their fundamental right to
free exercise, and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 282.
302
See id. at 282–83 & n.5 (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n.3 (2004)
(“Because we hold . . . that the program is not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause
. . . we apply rational-basis scrutiny to his equal protection claims.”). In Wirzburger,
plaintiffs’ free exercise claim failed because the constitutional provision prohibited
anyone, not just a religious group, from seeking an amendment initiative. Id. at 280.
Thus, the court applied rational basis scrutiny to plaintiffs’ related equal protection
claim. Id. at 282–83.
303
St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 901
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing Wirzburger, 412 F.3d at 282–83).
304
St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, No. 05-4418, 2007 U.S.
App. LEXIS 21914, at *62 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007).
305
Id. at *63–65.
306
Id. at *66.
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Rational basis review in the equal protection context was dem307
onstrated in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
In Cleburne, the city required a special use permit for construction of a
group home for mentally retarded individuals in a zone where other
buildings, such as dormitories, apartments, and hospitals, did not re308
The city’s proffered reasons for the special use
quire a permit.
permit were irrational; for example, the city feared that students in a
nearby junior high school would harass the occupants and that the
309
The Supreme
property would be located in a 500-year flood plain.
Court determined that the special use permit requirement discriminated against the disabled because “[t]he State may not rely on a
classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated
310
as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” Therefore, Cleburne’s classification of disabled persons failed rational basis scrutiny
because it was not rationally related to achieving a legitimate gov311
ernment interest.
In Kessler, the federal district court found that the plaintiffs made
out a claim that the condemnation proceeding by Essex Fells was as
312
irrational as the Cleburne zoning requirement.
The Bible college
had placed the property at issue on the market for almost two years
313
prior to Kessler’s purchase.
Essex Fells purchased a small portion
of the tract for use as a soccer field but never acquired the remain314
der. Thus, the only reason to condemn the entire tract (after a two
year lull) was the difference between uses—the Bible college versus a
315
facility for disabled persons.
The court concluded that negative attitudes toward the disabled, without any justifiable reason for the
condemnation, cannot serve as a rational basis for the borough’s ex316
ercise of eminent domain over the Kessler property.

307

473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Id. at 435, 436 & n.3, 437.
309
Id. at 448–50.
310
Id. at 446. The Court also emphasized the holding in United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, when it said “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group” is not a legitimate state interest on which to base a classification between
groups of persons. Id. at 446–47 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
311
Id. at 448, 450.
312
See Kessler Inst. for Rehab., Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Essex Fells, 876 F. Supp.
641, 663 (D.N.J. 1995).
313
Id.
314
Id.
315
Id.
316
Id.
308
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The application of rational basis scrutiny to an equal protection
claim is sufficient protection of religious institutions’ property interests. Rational basis scrutiny allows the government to pursue eminent
domain actions that serve a legitimate public purpose, but still allows
a court to halt a condemnation that targets religious property because of its religious nature. As mentioned above, in St. John’s, the
condemnation of the cemetery to expand the airport withstood rational basis scrutiny because it was the most effective way to create
317
additional runway space; the city did not target the religious prop318
erty to eliminate it from Chicago.
In contrast, a government exercise of its eminent domain power in an effort to rid the community of
the presence of a particular religious group is clearly discriminatory
and cannot be considered a rational means of furthering a legitimate
319
state interest.
Although an equal protection claim based on the same argument as an unsuccessful free exercise claim receives rational basis
scrutiny, “[o]ther types of equal protection claims may have inde320
pendent force, and must be considered accordingly.”
There may
be situations where a religious group can challenge a condemnation
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause on a theory unrelated to
321
A religious group may be able to bring
a free exercise argument.
322
an equal protection claim based on its status as a suspect class.
While religious affiliation alone is not suspect, if a religious group can
demonstrate that the government treated it differently than another
323
religious group, it may become a suspect class. For example, a Muslim group may challenge an eminent domain action against its religious property by arguing that a Catholic church, similarly situated
near the planned site of the public use, was not selected for condemnation. This type of claim will likely be accorded strict scrutiny review. Discrimination among religions, especially coupled with indicia of

317

St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 901
(N.D. Ill. 2005).
318
Id. at 898; see also St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, No. 054418, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914, at *65–66 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007) (“Anyone or
anything standing in the way of the O’Hare project faces the prospect of the City’s
exercise of its eminent domain power. We have no doubt that the legislature was
unmoved by St. John’s religious affiliation.”).
319
See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
320
Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282 n. 5 (1st Cir. 2005).
321
Id. at 282–83 & n.5.
322
Id. (citing Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (considering
plaintiff’s claim that conscientious objectors are a suspect class)).
323
St. John’s, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914, at *62–63.
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racial or national origin bias, suggests that one type of religion is targeted for unfavorable treatment.
Thus, an equal protection claim (the condemnation interfered
with the fundamental right to religious exercise) will only receive rational basis scrutiny if the related free exercise claim (the condemnation substantially burdened religious exercise) proves unsuccessful—
if the burden or interference with religious exercise results from a
neutral, generally applicable law or government action. Rational basis scrutiny, as demonstrated in Cleburne, Kessler, and St. John’s, is a sufficient standard of review because it will protect legitimate government actions from overzealous judicial review, but still detect
government actions directed toward religious groups because of their
religious nature. Parties that can demonstrate suspect class status
from evidence of discrimination among religions will deservedly receive heightened protection through strict scrutiny review.
Ultimately, eminent domain actions that are truly discriminatory
against religious institutions will be weeded out under traditional free
exercise and equal protection challenges. There is no need to encompass eminent domain within the scope of RLUIPA because there
is ample alternative legal recourse.
C. Potential Negative Effects of Amending RLUIPA to
Cover Eminent Domain
Slippery slope, parade of horribles, snowball effect—whatever
you choose to call it—the application of RLUIPA to condemnation of
religious property could extend to grossly unreasonable proportions.
As religious institutions place the “religious property” label on facilities that function much like private businesses, the government will
be substantially limited in its ability to take land for public use.
Many religious institutions offer services in addition to worship,
324
such as homeless shelters and youth groups.
However, there is a
current trend for many religious groups to put their properties to
325
326
non-traditional “auxiliary uses” and to grow into “megachurches.”

324

See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7777 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (written statement of
Wade Henderson, Executive Dir., Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); see Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 202, 204–05 (July 14, 1998) (statement of Rev. Elenora
Giddings Ivory, Dir., D.C. Office, Presbyterian Church (USA)), microformed on CIS
No. 00:H521-10 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
325
Sara C. Galvan, Note, Beyond Worship: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 and Religious Institutions’ Auxiliary Uses, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 207,
207 (2006).
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Churches have offered a wide variety of non-religious services, including restaurants, shopping centers, hospitals, and many other busi327
If these non-traditional services constitute religious exernesses.
cise, they would be covered by RLUIPA, because RLUIPA simply
applies to the imposition of a substantial burden on the “religious ex328
ercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution.”
“Religious exercise” is defined under RLUIPA as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief” and includes the “use, building, or conversion of real
329
property for the purpose of religious exercise.”
The language of
RLUIPA does not limit religious activity to worship within a church
330
Although the legislative history suggests the auxiliary uses
setting.
previously mentioned should not be extended the same protection as
traditional uses, Congress failed to make this distinction explicit
331
within the language of the statute.
It follows that if RLUIPA were amended to include eminent domain, religious institutions faced with a condemnation action targeting their properties put to auxiliary uses would be able to challenge
the condemnation as a violation of their right to free exercise. Hypothetically, if a church utilized adjacent property to operate a religious
book store for its congregation, and the municipality sought to condemn the store property for conversion into a public road, the
church could argue that the condemnation would substantially burden its ability to practice religion, which involves reading religious
texts conveniently or exclusively available from this church store.
This extension of the highest protection to auxiliary uses is excessive
and would clearly infringe upon the government’s ability to take private property for public use. Several courts that have addressed the
application of RLUIPA to auxiliary uses have refused to extend
332
However, these cases involved the
heightened protection this far.
326

Stephen A. Haller, Comment, On Sacred Ground: Exploring Congress’s Attempts to
Rein in Discriminatory State Zoning Practices, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 285, 301 (2004) (citation
omitted).
327
Galvan, supra note 325, at 207–08. (“The nation's second largest church (with
30,000 congregants) has even begun developing both a 1200-home neighborhood
and a 280-unit gated retirement community.”).
328
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000); see Galvan, supra note 325, at 208–09.
329
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A)–(B).
330
Id.
331
Galvan, supra note 325, at 223–24 (citing 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774, 7776
(daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy)).
332
Id. at 228–30 (citing Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d
183, 185–190 (2d Cir. 2004); Cathedral Church of the Intercessor v. Inc. Vill. of Malverne, 353 F. Supp. 2d 375, 380, 380–81, 390–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Castle Hills First
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application of zoning ordinances to religious property.
Given the
hostile climate to eminent domain post-Kelo, it is not far-fetched to
anticipate a court prohibiting a condemnation action against an auxiliary use.
If RLUIPA were amended to clearly include eminent domain,
the unnecessarily heightened protection could extend even further
than religious institutions’ auxiliary uses. In its amicus brief in support of the homeowners in Kelo, the Becket Fund expressed concern
that the expansion of the public use requirement to encompass economic development would allow municipalities to condemn religious
property more frequently than other types of property, because reli334
gious institutions are tax exempt.
The Becket Fund also expressed
the same concern for “other charitable organizations” that do not
335
It cited several examples of organizations
generate tax revenue.
faced with condemnation for replacement with stores and other
businesses: a Moose Lodge, an American Legion hall, a homeless
336
The application of RLUIPA to
shelter, and a Goodwill thrift store.
eminent domain, coupled with the Becket Fund’s expression of concern for the vulnerability of non-religious charitable organizations,
may encourage state legislatures to devise similar heightened protections for non-revenue or low-revenue generating establishments.
This would severely diminish the government’s ability to exercise its
vital takings power. It would also leave private homes and businesses
to face the brunt of condemnation proceedings as government entities try their best to manipulate public use plans away from religious
337
Worse yet, it could totally disand other charitable organizations.
courage government entities from pursuing necessary public use projects that involve condemnation of such organizations because they
338
The incluwould want to avoid expensive and lengthy litigation.
Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA-01-CA-1149-RF, 2004 WL 546792, at
*11–13 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004)).
333
Galvan, supra note 325, at 228–30.
334
Becket Fund Brief, supra note 68, at 11.
335
Id.
336
Id.
337
In fact, such discrepancy may raise challenges under the Establishment Clause
and create public resentment for religious groups whom they perceive to be receiving favorable treatment. See Graff, supra note 56, at 521–22; Hamilton, supra note
199.
338
See Galvan, supra note 325, at 231 (“[L]ocal governments worry about the time,
expense, and social cost of litigating against a well-funded or well-respected religious
institution. . . . [L]ocal governments have shown a tendency to acquiesce to the
threat of a RLUIPA-based challenge rather than take on the religious institution that
issued it.”). Although Galvan’s discussion of municipalities’ acquiescence in the face
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sion of eminent domain under RLUIPA would be unnecessarily expansive, tying the government’s hands and ultimately delaying or
preventing legitimate public projects.
V. CONCLUSION
In its current form, RLUIPA does not apply to eminent domain.
An amendment proposed by Senator Kennedy would include eminent domain within the definition of “land use regulation.” However, this is an unnecessary and potentially detrimental enlargement
of an already constitutionally questionable, yet powerful, law. Eminent domain is not the type of government action that Congress intended to police under RLUIPA; it does not involve the same individualized scrutiny of property as is involved in zoning and
landmarking laws. It is a more generally applicable, neutral power
that is adequately policed under current law without RLUIPA. If an
application of eminent domain discriminates against a religious institution, it will be prevented under existing free exercise and equal
protection law. If amended, RLUIPA would hold every eminent domain action that imposed a burden on a church, synagogue, mosque,
or temple under a microscope. When does eminent domain not impose a burden on a property-holder? By subjecting condemnations
of religious property to the highest scrutiny, RLUIPA would limit
deference to the government’s decision to invoke the power of eminent domain, an outcome contrary to precedent. Given the increasing size of churches and their auxiliary uses, along with the rallying
cry for other charitable organizations to oppose takings, the government may adopt a hands-off approach to religious property rather
than deal with costly and troublesome litigation, with the resulting
delay or outright abandonment of beneficial public use projects.
It is undeniable that religious institutions play an important role
in community life. It is also unfortunate that many religious institutions will experience harmful discriminatory treatment by government officials applying eminent domain to essentially remove unpopular religious believers from the neighborhood or limit their
activities. Both the free exercise right and the takings power are contained in the Bill of Rights. While religious liberty is one of the most
vital rights for all Americans—indeed the cornerstone of any truly
free society—it cannot be used to weaken the government’s power to
take private property for the public use. RLUIPA cannot erode the

of RLUIPA claims focuses on zoning issues, the same result can be hypothesized in
the condemnation context.
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eminent domain power in order to serve the interests of the few while
harming the interests of the public at large. Current free exercise,
equal protection, and takings jurisprudence is sufficient to balance
the needs of religious institutions with the interests of the government.
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